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Introduction
The world is facing a trend in rapid globalization, where international capital flows are accelerating and countries are deepening their trade relationships. One type of international capital flows which has received a lot of attention among academics and policy makers are foreign direct investments (FDI) . Especially among policy makers in developing countries, there has been a shift in focus on attracting more FDI. The rationale for increased efforts to attract more FDI stems from the belief that FDI has several positive effects which include productivity gains, technology transfers, the introduction of new processes, managerial skills, and know-how in the domestic market [Alfaro et al. (2004) ]. These positive effects of FDI stimulate economic growth, and should thus improve the living conditions of people in the receiving country. Numerous studies analyzing the link between FDI and growth have identified growth stimulating effects, at least under certain circumstances [e.g. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) , Borensztein et al. (1998) , Alfaro et al. (2004) , Hansen and Rand (2006) , Basu and Guariglia (2007) , and Alfaro et al. (2010) ]. However, little is known about the impact of FDI on regional inequalities within host countries, which will be at the heart of this paper.
There are several examples, such as China or India, where FDI inflows affect the different regions of the countries unequally [Siddharthan (2007) ]. In China -discussed later on in detail -FDI has been concentrated on the coastal regions and has been a major force in the strong increase in regional inequalities in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, FDI in India has been concentrated on the Western and Southern states and territories, enlarging the income gap between these regions and other parts of the country. Both examples imply that a conflict emerges between growth enhancing effects of FDI and increasing regional inequalities.
The link between FDI, growth and regional inequalities can be illustrated using a simple theoretical framework. Assume a federation consisting of two regions inhabited by immobile households. An influx of FDI in region 1 increases the capital stock raising the marginal product of labor, output and consumption in region 1. Note that the output promoting effects in region 1 emerge if FDI involves the transfer of physical capital as in the case of greenfield investment or capacity extensions as well as if intangible capital (knowledge) is transferred as in the case of mergers and acquisitions.
At the same time, nothing happens in region 2 at least as long as we abstract from spillovers.
Hence, region 1 will be richer than region 2 so that FDI increases overall output of the federation, but it also increases interregional inequality. If we relax the assumption of immobile households, region 2 will also benefit from the influx of FDI. Higher wages and consumption in region 1 will induce households to emigrate from region 2 into region 1, increasing the size of the labor force in the latter region. The influx of labor will depress labor productivity, wages and output per capita in region 1, while the opposite happens in region 2. The result is regional convergence, which becomes stronger as migration costs lower. The discussion shows that FDI increases regional inequalities in general, but the effect is smaller, the higher the degree of factor mobility is. Another issue affecting the relationship between FDI and regional inequality might be government policies which influence resource allocation -e.g. subsidies, local tax holidays, etc. -in order to promote a more equal interregional distribution. Importantly, the cases of high factor mobility or government reallocation policies are less relevant for developing economies than for high income countries due to the worse infrastructure and weak fiscal capacities. Thus, the relationship between FDI and regional inequalities should be conditional on the stage of economic development a country is at, where FDI has a stronger increasing effect on regional inequalities in developing economies compared to high-income countries. The aim of this paper is to search for empirical evidence for this hypothesis.
Although the major contribution of this paper is the analysis of panel data, I first discuss the Chinese case as an introductory example. Almost the entire literature on FDI and regional inequalities concentrates on China.
1 Therefore a discussion of the Chinese case substitutes for a discussion of existing empirical literature, and at the same time illustrates how FDI affects regional inequality. The Chinese case shows, that FDI did increase regional inequalities, but these negative effects have vanished since the mid 1990s. In fact, recent data implies that FDI might have contributed to the weak convergence trend among provinces since 2004.
Subsequent to the discussion of the Chinese case I conduct a panel data analysis using a unique data set of regional inequalities in 55 countries for the period between 1980 and 2009. The data set covers high-income as well as low and middle income countries in order that it is well suited to test the impact of economic development on the relationship between FDI and regional inequalities. It turns out, that there is no unconditional effect of FDI on regional inequality, but -in line with the theory -FDI increases regional inequalities in developing economies while it has almost no significant effect on regional inequalities in high-income countries. Instrumental variable regressions, which consider a weak instrument bias, support this major finding. I also try to disentangle the different determinants of the FDI-regional inequality nexus -factor mobility and government policiesusing proxy variables for those different determinants. The regressions imply that both factors are decisive.
The paper is related to studies on interpersonal inequality and FDI such as Tsai (1995), Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Choi (2006) , Basu and Guariglia (2007) and Dreher and Gaston (2008) . The important difference between these studies and my analysis is that I focus on interregional inequality -that is the differences between the regions of a country. In this regard, this study comes from geographer's perspective to distribution of economic activity. The distinction is important, since recent studies on the causes of conflict suggest that not vertical inequalities (interpersonal inequalities) are related to conflict [see Stewart (2000 Stewart ( , 2002 ], but horizontal inequalities (interregional inequalities) are decisive here [see Deiwiks et al. (2012) , Buhaug et al. (2012) and Lessmann (2012b) ]. Therefore, interregional might be the more interesting factor for a society. Interregional inequalities are even more important, if they overlap with the geographic location of different ethnic groups [see Kanbur and Zhang (2005) ].
The difference between interpersonal and interregional inequality can also be illustrated based on the simple model presented above. Assume a symmetric two region federation, with both regions inhabited by a similar number of households of different income classes (say due to different skill levels). Therefore, we observe interpersonal inequality between and within regions, but no interregional inequality. An influx of FDI into one region will unambiguously increase interregional inequality, but not necessarily interpersonal inequality. If the poor in the FDI hosting region are the beneficiary party -e.g. if they switch from agriculture to a new industry sector -, than interpersonal inequalities decrease while interregional inequalities increase. In light of this, a study of interregional inequalities is interesting, since the effects of FDI inflows can be very different from interpersonal inequalities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the case of China and presents some recent data. Section 3 presents a unique data set on regional inequalities 4 around the world, which is used in Section 4 to investigate the impact of FDI. Section 5 sums up and concludes.
The Chinese case
The role of FDI in China's economic progress has attracted a lot of attention in the literature.
Academic work on FDI and regional inequalities mostly deals with China. Foreign investments have been a blessing for China's growth performance, but a curse for regional inequality. More than 80% of China's FDI inflows are concentrated in the East [Wei et al. (2009) ].
The geographic concentration has several causes. Most importantly, the economic reforms started in the eastern provinces. The regions Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan, Pudong, and 14 coastal cities were declared as designated Special Economic Zones, Development Zones, or Economic and Technology Development Zones. These regions were given preferential policies and were opened gradually to foreign investors. The opening policies moved to the north in the mid-1980s, and 2 The data refers to the World Development Indicators 2010. (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) to the center in the early 1990s. In the late 1990s, China announced a Western Development
Programm to restore more balanced regional development.
A number of studies have analyzed the relationship between FDI and regional inequality in China. Chen and Fleisher (1996) investigate province level data over 1978-1993 and find FDI to reduce regional inequality in China overall, but to increase the differential between coast and non-coast regions. Sun and Chai (1998) investigate the effects of FDI on growth in the eastern and western provinces from 1986 to 1992. They find a growth enhancing effect of FDI in the east, but only weak effects in the west and conclude that FDI has contributed to the rise of regional inequality in China. The studies by Fujita and Hu (2001) , Bao et al. (2002) , Zhang and Zhang (2003) , Jones et al. (2003) , Fu (2004) , Kanbur and Zhang (2005) , Wei et al. (2009), and Fleisher et al. (2010) unambiguously support this finding. The most recent data used in these papers is from 2003, therefore a new look at the recent developments will be meaningful. Figure 1 illustrates the coefficient of variation of provincial GDP as well as the FDI/GDP ratio for China as a whole. The figure suggests a negative relationship between FDI and regional inequality for this recent period.
In the period from 1994 to 2003, FDI was decreasing while regional inequalities were rising. Since 2003/2004, FDI increased slightly and regional inequalities declined. The correlation coefficient 6 between the coefficient of variation and the FDI/GDP ratio is -0.37 for the whole period.
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At first glance, this recent development seems to contradict earlier findings. 4 However, Wei et al.
(2009) also relate the coefficient of variation of provincial GDP to the FDI/GDP ratio, finding quite similar results. While FDI increased regional inequality until the mid-1990s, the income gap between coastal and inland regions has slightly declined since then. The authors conclude that the government's Western Development Programm and the Rebuilding Programm of the Northeast
Region was the major determinant of the changing trend. What I observe in the more recent data seems to be the continuance of this trend.
The Chinese case supports the main hypothesis of this paper, which states that the level of economic development is a decisive factor for the FDI-regional inequality nexus. At an early stage of economic development, the influx of FDI increased regional inequality in China since investments concentrated on only a few coastal regions. These regions benefited from the increased capital stock, while the central and western regions remained almost unaffected. At a later stage of economic development, at the end of the 1990s, FDI did not have these negative redistributional effects, because the Chinese government implemented policies aiming at a reallocation of resources.
Thus, in the meanwhile higher developed Chinese economy, FDI no longer has a negative redistributional effect. The aim of this paper is to test this relationship in a cross-section of countries, which is important in order to generalize country specific experiences.
Regional inequalities around the world
Regional inequalities are not only of concern in China, but a widespread phenomenon among several developing and high-income countries. Regional inequalities matter since they are an important determinant of interpersonal income inequality. Yemtsov (2005) and Elbers et al. (2005) estimate that interregional inequality explains about one-third of interpersonal income inequality. However regional inequalities also matter, as they might be derived from ethnic discrimination and can be 3 Using alternative measures of regional inequality has no effect on the quality of this result. The correlation between the FDI/GDP ratio and the adjusted Gini coefficient of provincial GDP is -0.39, and the correlation between the FDI/GDP ratio and the weighted coefficient of variation is -0.27. See section 3 for a detailed of the calculation of inequality measures. 4 Using measures of regional inequality I focus on the concept of σ-convergence which is different from the β-convergence mainly considered in the literature. The concept of σ-convergence can be defined as a group of regions "are converging in the sense of σ if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over time" [Sala-i-Martin (1996) , p. 1020]. We observe β-convergence if poor regions grow faster than richer ones. Note that β-convergence does not necessarily implies σ-convergence, e.g. if poor regions overtake [Quah (1993) ].
a breeding ground for separatist tendencies and internal conflicts [Kanbur and Venables (2005) ].
Knowing more about regional inequalities and its determinants -such as FDI -is thus important for academics as well as policy makers.
Empirical research in this field suffers from the poor availability of reliable data on regional inequalities, which is one reason why the existing literature on FDI and regional inequalities concentrates on China, where data availability is quite good. For comparative cross-country studies -as applied in this paper -one needs regional economic accounts at a widely homogenous territorial level for countries at all levels of economic development. The OECD Regional Statistics or EUROSTAT provide such data since the 1980s/1990s. However, data of developing or emerging economies is scarce and cannot be accessed through one single data base. For this study, the data was collected from several national statistical offices or central banks.
5 Besides availability of data, measurement of regional inequality is difficult as well. Three different decisions arise: the choice of an appropriate economic indicator, the territorial level to be applied, and an applicable concentration measure.
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The majority of cross-country studies on regional inequalities use the regional GDP p.c. as a starting point for calculating disparity measures [see e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1996) or Lessmann (2009) ].
This economic account is problematic because it is quite sensitive to biases resulting from commuters or unequal (un-)employment. For this reason, some studies rely on the regional income p.c. [Shankar and Shah (2003) ] or the GDP per worker [Gil Canaleta et al. (2004) ] which is not an option for my analysis due to missing data for most low and middle income countries. The regional GDP p.c. is thus best suited to investigate regional inequalities in a cross-section of countries.
The different sizes of the regions within countries have also important implications for measuring regional inequalities. In countries with large economic differences and an unequally distributed population, a disparity measure might be difficult to interpret. For example the three large Canadian Territories are much poorer than the regions at the east and west coast, therefore an inequality measure might indicate large economic differences within the country. However, very few people are affected from relative poverty since the three territories are inhabited by only 100,000 people, while Canada has 34 million inhabitants in total. Therefore, it is necessary to use a territorial clas-5 Details of the particular sources of regional data are provided by has driven the selection of territorial levels. In most cases, the regional level is equivalent to state or province level as in the example of China discussed above. I also calculate a measure of regional inequality that is adjusted for the different population sizes of the regions (weighted coefficient of variation, WCV ) so that a serious bias due to the application of different territorial levels is less likely. Also the inclusion of country-fixed effects in regression analysis helps in reducing such a bias.
The application of suitable concentration measures is the final concern. Different measures of inequality do not always yield the same country ranking. Especially in a cross-country analysis, the concentration measure should be independent of the number of regions considered, should not be sensitive to shifts in average GDP levels due to growth or inflation, and should satisfy the PigouDalton transfer principle [Dalton (1920) , Pigou (1912) ]. This principle states that an arithmetical transfer from rich to poor regions reduces inequality [see Sen (1973) and Mehran (1976) for details].
These requirements are satisfied by the coefficient of variation (CV ), the adjusted Gini coefficient (GINI ) and the population-weighted coefficient of variation (WCV ):
y is the country's average GDP p.c., y i is the GDP p.c. of region i, p i is the share of the country's total population in region i, and n is the number of sub-national units.
10 Please see Table A .1 in the appendix for the territorial level applied in each country, the source of the regional data, and available years.
7 See Gennaioli et al. (2011) for a study that focuses on regional units with the highest degree of political authority. 8 NUTS -Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. Note that I have used the NUTS3 territorial level in case of Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta, since NUTS2 level data is not provided. 9 See Bendel et al. (1989) for a comparison of standard inequality measures. 10 Note that the Theil-index is not applicable for cross-section analysis with large variations in the number of sub-national units of the countries considered, since its values range from 0 to ln(n) [Hale (2003) ].
I have calculated these concentration measures based on the regional GDP p.c. for 55 countries covering the period 1980-2009. Note that the frequency of the data varies for countries: in case of the OECD countries the underlying panel is almost balanced, but there are quite large gaps in the data for the developing economies. To get a first impression of the data, country means for the whole observation period are presented in Table 1 classified by income. I will discuss just the coefficient of variation CV and leave it to the reader to compare results of alternative concentration measures. Differences are not very large since the correlation between the different indicators is 0.91 or higher. The most conspicuous observation is that regional inequalities are on average much higher in low ). An explanation is provided by Williamson (1965) , who argues that regional inequalities increase in the process of economic development, but they tend to diminish, if high levels of economic development are reached. Turning our attention to single countries, we find New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden, and Denmark as the countries with the lowest levels of regional inequalities in terms of the CV. The data also implies that the concern about regional inequality in China is justified, since China is among the countries with the highest levels of regional inequalities, falling right after Indonesia, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Iran. For a reliable panel data analysis, it is also important to have data that varies within countries over time.
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In order to get a basic idea of the changes in regional inequalities I have plotted the CV in Figure 2 for a sample of countries. I have chosen the United States of America, Russia, Germany, Turkey, Thailand, China, Bolivia, and South Korea to illustrate data of countries from all regions of the world at different stages of economic development. In the U.S. we observe a fairly high variation over time with high levels of regional inequality at the beginning of the observation period followed by a decline in the 1980s and rising inequalities since the end of the 1990s. In Germany, Korea, and
Turkey regional inequalities are quite stable over time. In contrast, the volatility in Russia, China, Thailand and Bolivia is high. Internal conflicts in Bolivia, where separatist groups have tried to gain autonomy in the resource-rich provinces, have caused a rapid increase in regional inequalities since 2005. The dynamics of the regional inequalities in China are also much higher than in other parts of the world, which was another reason for the empirical literature to focus on China. So far, we can say from the analysis that inequalities vary between countries as well as over time, which is important for the investigation of the effects of FDI inflows on regional inequalities.
Empirical analysis
The case of China suggests that FDI promotes regional inequality, but as economic development proceeds, the negative redistributional effects of FDI vanish. As discussed in the introductory section, this can be explained within a simple theoretical framework, where the regions of a country benefit differently from FDI inflows. Generally, an influx of FDI, which is unequally distributed among the different areas of a country, should be associated with increasing regional inequalities, but the higher the level of economic development, that is the higher the factor mobility and the more effective the government reallocation policies, the lower the negative redistributional consequences from FDI should be. In this section, I will test this hypothesis based on a unique panel data set.
Data and methodology
The previous section has presented measures of regional inequality in detail which will be the dependent variable in the forthcoming regression analysis. The discussion of the independent variables still remains, in particular source and definition of FDI data. This analysis assumes that FDI changes the capital stock in host regions affecting regional inequality within countries. Since countries, especially high developed countries also face outflows of capital which affect regions differently, it is necessary to study net FDI (inflows minus outflows) instead of gross values. The definition of FDI, as taken from the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments database, is the following: FDI are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. To have a variable suitable for a cross-country analysis, FDI are taken as a share of the GDP. In doing so, we follow studies on FDI and growth such as Alfaro et al. (2004) or Basu and Guariglia (2007) .
A general problem with FDI data is that one cannot disentangle greenfield investment and capacity extensions from mergers & acquisitions [Bertrand (2004) A scatter plot of the data gives a first impression. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between FDI (abscissa) and regional inequality (ordinate) using means of the whole observation period . High income countries are marked by circles and low and middle income countries by quadrangles. The upper left quadrangle is Indonesia, which has the highest regional inequality among all considered countries. If we classify Indonesia as an outlier and disregard it for a moment one might draw a trend line with a positive slope trough the quadrangles implying that FDI is positively associated with regional inequality in low and middle income countries. In the group of high-income countries, there is no trend observable at a first glance. Insofar, the data seems 
REGINEQ i,t reflects one of the alternative measures of regional inequality (CV, GINI, or WCV ), α i are country fixed effects, X j,i,t are k exogenous control variables affecting regional inequality, GDPPC i,t is the Log of the GDP per capita, FDI i,t represents net FDI inflows as percentage of the GDP, FDI i,t ×GDPPC i,t is an interaction variable of FDI inflows and the Log of the GDP p.c.
(GDPPC ), and i is a random error term.
Using country fixed effects has several advantages which are important for this analysis. First of all, such regressions focus on within country variations in the data which is the more appropriate approach to testing the theoretical predictions in contrast to the between country variations focused on in a standard cross-section analysis. Moreover, country fixed effects are able to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity between countries [Baltagi (2005) ]. This is very important for maintain-ing the quality of the analysis, since there are numerous factors driving regional inequalities that I cannot control for, because of this an omitted variable bias may affect the quality of estimates. For example, the territorial level is not perfectly homogenous for the whole group of countries in the sample, therefore the degree of (dis-)aggregation of the regions might affect the level and dynamic of the regional inequalities [see section 3 for details]. One might also think of geographic factors such as mountains, coasts, deserts, etc. which are determinants of regional inequality, but difficult to consider in an econometric analysis. All of these country-specific determinants of regional inequalities are captured by the country dummies.
I consider two different estimation procedures: standard OLS and an instrumental variable approach, since it may be argued that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates suffer from an endogeneity bias. Foreign investors might avoid countries with a high level of regional inequality since they are afraid of the higher risk of internal conflicts such as riots, terrorist attacks, or civil war [Lucas (1990) , Janeba (2002) ].
12 Or, contrariwise, foreign investors concentrate on countries with rapidly increasing regional inequalities, since they may be an outcome of a dynamic economic prosperity they want to participate in. In both cases, net FDI inflows are an endogenous regressor in the econometric model, which would result in a bias in the OLS coefficient. This also affect the development level as well as the interaction variable of net FDI inflows and income, therefore all these variables should be treated as endogenous. The major problem is, that it is difficult to find suitable instruments for FDI flows in a panel data set. Influential studies such as Porta et al. (1998) and Alfaro et al. (2004) use a country's legal origin as instrument for FDI flows, since investor conditions are related to the distinct legal systems (i.e. common law system versus civil laws system). Gill (2006) and others suggests that international trade has an impact on regional disparities, so I also control for trade openness using the sum of imports and exports as a share of the GDP.
To capture agglomeration effects, I control for the share of urban living population [Krugman and Elizondo (1996) ]. The effects concerning a country's size are considered by including the logarithm of the total population, since size in terms of geographic area is time invariant, and hence not possible to be considered in the country fixed effects model. Since farm-based economies at an early stage of economic development might have higher regional inequalities, I also control for the share of employment in the agricultural sector. Sources and definitions of all considered variables are provided in Table A .2 in the appendix; Table A .3 provides summary statistics.
Estimation results
In the following, I present the main results of my analysis. In this main part of the analysis I focus on the coefficient of variation of regional GDP p.c. (CV ) as dependent variable; the alternative disparity measures GINI and WCV are used for robustness tests in section 4.3. Table 2 presents the results of different specifications of equation (4) using the OLS and and LIML estimator.
Column (1) and (2) report results of OLS estimations; column (3) and (4) present results using the LIML estimator. In the results presented in column (1) only the income level shows a significant effect. Without the interaction term, the estimations show that there is no unconditional impact of FDI on regional inequality. That is not surprising, since the theoretical framework suggests that the effect varies with the level of economic development. Inclusion of the interaction variable produces significant effects (column 2). The coefficient γ 2 of the FDI variable is positive and statistically significant at a 1% confidence level, while the coefficient γ 3 of the interaction term FDI i,t ×GDPPC i,t is negative and also significant at a 1% level. This result suggests that the effect of FDI inflows on regional inequality depends on the development level of a country. In low income countries, FDI inflows increase regional inequalities, while FDI inflows do not have a t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In the instrumental variable regressions, the Log of GDP p.c., FDI net inflows and their interaction are treated as endogenous. Their one-5year-period lagged levels are used as instruments. Table A .4 in the appendix shows the effect of lagged levels of the endogenous regressors on the current inequality index. First stage regression diagnostics are reported in Table A .5 in the appendix.
negative redistributional effect in high income countries. Note that the marginal effect of FDI on regional inequality is calculated below.
The instrumental variable regressions reported in column (3) and (4), respectively, support these findings. The GDP p.c., FDIs and the interaction variable are treated as endogenous variable.
The instruments in the first stage of the regression are the one-period lagged levels. For the validity of the instruments, one has to check whether the exclusion restriction is satisfied, that is, the instrument should not affect the dependent variable in the second stage regression equation. Table A .4 in the appendix shows a two-ways fixed effects regression, where the measure of inequality is regressed on the lagged levels of the endogenous variables. It turns out that the instruments (lagged levels) are not significantly related to current inequality (t-values < 0.45). At the same time, the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variables is 0.75 or higher.
Insofar, the instruments seem to be valid. However, the F statistics of the first stage regressions imply, that even the lagged values are weak instruments. The results are reported in Table A.5 in the appendix. The F statistic of excluded instruments never reaches the critical value, which is around 10 in TSLS estimations [see Stock and Yogo (2005) ]. Therefore, I have choosen the LIML estimator instead of TSLS, which reduces the weak instrument bias in instrumental variable regressions. Due to the weak instrument, I only employed just-identified estimations (number of endogenous variables equals number of instruments), since they are median-unbiased. To sum up, the instrumental variable regressions support the OLS findings, but I have to admit that the results may suffer from a weak instrument bias.
The statistical significance of the individual coefficients as reported in Table 2 does not necessarily imply that the marginal effect of FDI inflows on regional inequality is statistically significant [see Brambor et al. (2006) ]. I am not particularly interested in the individual statistical significance of either of these terms. Instead, I am interested in their joint significance or, more correctly, the marginal effect of FDI on regional inequality depending on the level of economic development. The marginal effect can be calculated using γ 2 and γ 3 given the log of the GDP p.c. [see equation (4)]:
The interaction model asserts that the effect of a change in FDI inflows on regional inequality depends on the value of the conditioning variable GDPPC. While it is possible to calculate the marginal effect using equation (5) and the regression coefficients reported in Table 2 , it is not possible to do so for the standard errors. The standard error of interest is:
The standard errors can be used to calculate confidence bands around the marginal effects. Figure 4 and ?? illustrate how the marginal effect of FDI inflows on regional inequality varies with the level of economic development, and it comprises confidence bands for the 10 percent significance level as calculated by equation (6).
The negative slope of the marginal effect is an outcome of the negative coefficient of the interaction variable (γ 3 ). For low GDP p.c. levels, the marginal effect of FDI on regional inequality is positive, while the effect vanishes with increasing development. The cutoff value of economic development is the value of the log of the GDP p.c. fulfilling ∂REGIN EQ/∂F DI = 0 is 9.4 which corresponds to a GDP of approximately 11,000 US$ p.c. 13 Countries poorer than this threshold experience negative redistributional consequences from FDI inflows. Note that the marginal effect calculated from the IV regressions implies that FDI inflows have not significant effect on regional inequalities in high income countries. In low income countries, FDI is harmful for regional equity. To sum up: The results support the hypothesis that FDI inflows foster regional inequality depending on the level of economic development: FDI aggravates regional inequality especially in less developed countries, while the effect is less evident in high-income countries.
Robustness tests
A number of robustness tests have been carried out in order to study the stability of the main results. The first set of robustness tests show that the results are independent of the measure of regional inequality. Table A .6 in the appendix reports estimations similar to those reported in Table 2 using the Gini coefficient (GINI ) and the weighted coefficient of variation (WCV ) as the dependent variable. In both cases, the results support the findings of the previous section.
The second robustness test considers different period averages in order to disentangle the short-run from the long-run effects of FDI on regional inequality. Table A .7 reports the estimation results using the three different measures of regional inequality (CV, GINI, and WCV ) with annual data as well as ten-year period averages. In all cases the general finding holds, but it is interesting to take a closer look at the regression diagnostics. The adjusted R-squared increases as the period being averaged increases. For example, in Table 2 above, the R-squared was 0.394 in the fully specified regression (column 2). Column (1) and (2) of Table A .7 show that the R-squared is considerably smaller using annual data (0.300), but much higher using 10-year averages (0.529).
Thus, the empirical model is better suited to explain long-run effects of FDI inflows rather than short-run effects.
In a third robustness test the sample is adjusted for extreme observations in order to test whether outliers impact the results. In all estimations discussed from now on, the basic setting uses the CV as dependent variable with 5-year period averages similar to the regressions reported above. Table A .8 in the appendix presents the results. In column (1) I have dropped the poorest countries with less than 3,000 US$ GDP p.c. from the sample; in column (2) I have dropped the richest countries with a GDP p.c. of more than 27,000 US$. In both cases, the general finding holds, but it is worth mentioning that dropping the richest countries increases the fit of the regressions significantly: the R-squared increase from 0.368 to 0.427. Next, I have dropped the observations that have an FDI to GDP ratio of more than 20% (column 3) and that have an FDI to GDP ratio of less than 1% (column 4). In both sample adjustments the major results hold. Moreover, the regression fit is much improved if the observations with a very small FDI to GDP ratio are dropped (column 4). Note that some countries have also experienced disinvestment periods. The final adjustment of the sample for extreme values is to exclude the countries with very high values of the CV -such as Indonesia -(column 5) and very low values of the CV (column 6). Again, the main findings hold.
The last series of robustness tests concerns other factors that might affect the relationship between FDI and regional inequality. In particular, the fairly large differences of the territorial level between the countries in the sample might bias estimates since the effects from commuters or regional spillovers are not comparable. For example, with Malta and Slovenia, I consider two very small countries with an area of just 320 and 20,100 square kilometers respectively, because of this it might be not suitable to compare those countries with larger countries such as Canada or China.
Thus, I dropped those small countries will less than 3 sub-national units from the data set. As the results reported in column (7) of Table A .8 imply, this adjustment does not change anything in the major findings. I also drop highly fragmented countries with more than 25 sub-natational units from the sample (column 8), which does not alter the main finding. In column (9), I have used only OECD countries, since the territorial level is more homogeneous for this sample of countries, 20 and in column (10) I concentrated on countries from Europe and Central Asia for the same reason.
In the sample of (rich) OECD countries, the effect of FDI on regional inequality disappears, which is in line with the main finding presented above. The last robustness test is to exclude federal countries (column 11). There is a fairly vast amount of empirical literature about the impact of decentralization on regional inequalities [e.g. Shankar and Shah (2003) , Lessmann (2009 Lessmann ( , 2012 , or
Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) (1965) and Barrios and Strobl (2009) ]. However, the regressions using both interaction variables
shows that the coefficient of the FDI i,t ×GDPPC i,t interaction variable has a significant effect even if I control for a possible nonlinearity in the income effect. Note that this does not imply, that the quadratic function of income is not relevant at all, since the marginal effect of income on inequality now also depends on FDI flows [see Lessmann (2011)] . Altogether, the different tests show a robust relationship between FDI and regional inequalities depending on the level of economic development.
Development-related determinants of the FDI-regional inequality nexus
The empirical analysis shows, that FDI fosters regional inequalities in less developed countries, while there are no significant negative redistributional consequences in high-income economies. I have argued throughout the paper that economic development goes hand in hand with mobility of factors, and more (effective) government policies aimed at reallocation of factors between regions.
Countries at a higher stage of economic development have a better infrastructure, more transport facilities, and a higher skilled and more mobile work force than poorer countries. Moreover, highly developed economies have more effective governments and a higher fiscal capacity, which is important for the reallocation of resources between regions. Possible instruments to achieve 21 a more equal distribution are measures such as tax holidays in disadvantaged regions, subsidies for particular industries, and public investments in productive public goods. A potentially less useful instrument are interregional transfers in terms of formal fiscal equalization programs since these are likely to increase regional inequalities due to the adverse effects they have on convergence promoting migration [see Kessler et al. (2011) for details].
In this section, I will try to disentangle these different arguments: internal migration vs. government policies. The major challenge is to find appropriate variables which approximate these issues.
In particular, in case of internal migration, data availability is poor especially in less developed countries. Therefore, I rely mainly on variables that correlate highly with internal migration rates, but I also consider explicitly the internal migration rates for 20 OECD countries.
14 The empirical strategy is to let the proxy variables interact with FDI inflows instead of using the GDP p.c.
15
Please note that we should be cautious concerning a causal interpretation of the results. Due to the poor availability of data, I am not able to provide convincing instrumental variable regression results. The results are reported in Table 3 for internal migration as a determinant for the FDI-regional inequality nexus.
The first proxy variable is the degree of urbanization (column 1). I assume interregional mobility of households to be higher in urban economies. For the 20 OECD countries where internal migration ratios are available, the correlation coefficient between urbanization and internal migration is 0.33, supporting this assumption. As another proxy variable, I use the Gini coefficient of the population distribution among the different regions of a country as conditioning variable (column 2). This measure reflects another kind of agglomeration: while the degree of urbanization may be similar in the different regions of a country, the measure of the population distribution captures whether the population is unequally distributed in a country in general. Canada is an example of a country with a very unequally distributed population. Another proxy for household mobility is the number of cars per 1,000 people (column 3), which highly correlates with the degree of urbanization, though it is negatively correlated with internal migration rates. Next I use the traffic density, which is defined as vehicles (cars, motorcycles, etc.) per kilometer of road (column 4). Interestingly, this
14 See Bell and Muhidin (2009) for a discussion of problems that emerge using cross country data on internal migration. Focusing on OECD countries reduces these problems, since the regional level is reasonably comparable between countries. 15 I have also considered an econoemtric model where the interaction of net FDI inflows enters as additional regressor.
However, this does not yield significant effects in the majority of regressions due to the high multicollinearity of the interaction variables. The correlation between the interaction variables is between 0.74 and 0.98. t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
proxy is almost perfectly correlated with internal migration rates. As already mentioned, I have explicit data on internal migration for 20 OECD countries, which I use in the regressions reported in column (5).
The results imply that internal migration plays an important role in the relationship between FDI and regional inequality. The interaction variable is negative and statistically significant in the case of the degree of urbanization (column 1), traffic density (column 4), and internal migration rates (column 5). In the case of the population concentration (column 2), the sign of the interaction variable is correct but the t-statistics is too small with a value of 1.31. The number of cars does not affect the relationship between FDI and regional inequality.
The other reason for economic development to be decisive for the relationship between FDI and regional inequalities are government policies. The case of China has demonstrated that governments in FDI hosting countries react to the rising inequalities induced by FDI inflows. In China, the government has implemented special development programs for the lagging western part of the country, which seemed to be quite successful. The instruments through which the government can try to reallocate resources are diverse, so it might be difficult to find a single variable to capture similar issues in different countries. The proxy variables I use for government reallocation policies are an index of government effectiveness, the share of subsidies in total government expenditures, the tax to GDP ratio, and government size defined as government expenditures as a share of the GDP. Table 4 reports the results of the different specifications.
Government effectiveness (column 1) seems to be an important determinant for the FDI-inequality nexus. The results suggest that highly effective governments are able to compensate for the negative redistributional consequences from FDI inflows, although I am not able to identify the particularly effective instruments. A country with an ineffective (e.g. corrupt, kleptocratic or with a low bureaucratic quality) government may not be able or willing to reallocate factors in order to achieve a more equal distribution among the different regions of a country. Government effectiveness -as measured by the index of bureaucratic quality provided by the International Country Risk Guide -seems to be helpful in achieving a more equal factor distribution. Note that this proxy variable is highly correlated with other institutional characteristics as well as economic development itself, because of this it is impossible to identify whether this is actually the driving force. Subsidies are a specific instrument through which a government can affect the allocation of FDI (column 2). I use subsidies as a share of government expenditures as a proxy variable. The interaction variable shows the correct negative sign implying that subsidies decrease the negative redistributional effects from FDI inflows, although the effect is not statistically significant at a conventional confidence levels. The problem with the proxy variable is that I have no information about the type of subsidies or their geographic distribution. The rationale for the next two proxy variables -24 tax/GDP ratio and government size (expenditure/GDP ratio) -is that governments need sufficient financial power to be able to affect the allocation of FDI (column 3 and 4). If the government budget is small, I expect less effective government policies concerning the interregional distribution of factors. The estimations suggest that the negative redistributional consequence of FDI inflows on regional inequalities decrease with government size as expected.
I am completely aware of the measurement problems of the variables applied to test the different determinants. However, the regressions imply that both conditioning factors -internal migration and government policies -are important here. Thus, in order to reduce the negative effects of FDI inflows, governments might engage in policies, which aim at increasing factor mobility as well as in redistributional policies through the budget. 
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Summary and conclusion
Countries try to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) in order to stimulate economic growth.
At the same time, FDI might cause a rise in regional inequality, since capital investments usually distribute asymmetrically among the different regions of a country as the examples of China and India suggest. Increasing interregional inequalities may cause conflicts and increase undesirable interpersonal inequalities. Against this background, this paper studies the impact of FDI on regional inequality. This is particularly important, since studies on inequality and conflict suggest that vertical inequality -e.g. measured by the Gini coefficient of household incomes -is not robustly related to conflict measures, while horizontal inequality is [see Stewart (2000 Stewart ( , 2002 , Deiwiks et al. (2012) , Buhaug et al. (2012) and Lessmann (2012b) ]. Economic theory suggests that the level of economic development has an impact on the FDI-regional inequality nexus. The higher the interregional mobility of individuals and the more effective government policies are in reallocating resources between regions, the weaker the negative redistributional consequences from FDI inflows should be. Both conditions are less appropriate for low and middle income countries than high income economies, therefore I hypothesize that the negative impact of FDI on regional inequality decreases with a higher level of economic development.
The existing literature on FDI and regional inequality focuses on China or Chinese provinces; because of this the analysis starts with a review of the well-known Chinese case supplemented by some recent data. After the opening of the economy in the 1980s FDI inflows increased rapidly causing a sharp rise in regional inequality. As a reaction, the Chinese government started in the mid 1990s to channel FDI inflows to less developed western regions. Some recent data shows that this government intervention was successful, as regional inequalities have been falling since this time. Thus, during China's development from a low to a middle income economy, the negative redistributional consequences from FDI inflows vanished as suggested by the theoretical framework.
The Chinese experience creates a motivation to study a cross-section of countries in order to be able to generalize the research findings.
For this purpose, a unique data set of regional inequalities in 55 countries at all stages of economic development for the period 1980-2009 is analyzed in this paper. Panel regressions suggest that the Chinese experience also applies to the broader data set: While FDI fosters regional inequalities in low and middle income countries, the negative redistributional effects do not occur in high income economies. The estimations also suggest that the fit of the empirical model is much better for medium-and long-term data than for analyzing short run effects. Instrumental variable regressions considering issues related to weak instruments support the major findings.
Finding economic development -as measured by the log of the GDP p.c. -to be an important determinant for the FDI-regional inequality nexus is interesting, but still somewhat unsatisfactory, since one cannot disentangle whether the higher mobility of factors is responsible for this result or government policies. Therefore, I have tried to find suitable approximations for both determinants "mobility of individuals"and "government reallocation policies". Although the proxy variables are disputable, the estimations imply that both conditioning factors are important. In this respect, the evidence from the cross-section supports the Chinese experience, where government policies were the major determinant of the diminishing the negative impact of FDI on regional inequality [Wei et al. (2009) ].
The findings of this study are compatible with the existing literature on FDI and growth. An important contribution is Alfaro et al. (2004) who find the relationship between FDI and growth to depend on the quality of financial institutions: the better the financial institutions of FDI hosting countries, the stronger is the growth enhancing effect of FDI. If we assume in line with Levine and Zervos (1998) that the quality of financial institutions -call it financial development -highly correlates with the level of economic development, than the findings of Alfaro et al. (2004) implies that high developed countries benefit stronger from FDI compared to less developed countries. This result may be driven at least to some extent by the negative redistributive effect of FDI on regional inequality in developing countries as this analysis shows. As discussed by Kanbur and Zhang (2005) regional inequality promotes interpersonal income inequality, which have a dampening effect on economic growth [Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ].
In light of the empirical findings, the policy conclusion from this analysis is that if governments aim to alleviate the negative redistributional consequences from FDI inflows as they occur in low and middle income countries, policies pointing at increased mobility of factors -such as enhanced infrastructure provision -seem to be appropriate as well as direct interventions through government expenditures. Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; a : countries dropped with a GDP p.c. <3,000US$; b : countries dropped with a GDP p.c. >27,000US$.
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